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COPYRIGHT DEPOSIT 






A COKKECT HISTORY 



OF 




, and Fitz Joliii Porter 



AT THE 



Second Battle of Bull Run 



AUGUST 20, 1862. 



/ 



By 1. WORTHINGTON, 
Late Coloxel 46th Ohio Volunteers. 



COPYRIGHT SECURED, 



'^'^ Of Cc- -~^ 



i"b30 ^■»- 

WASIIINGTOX, D. C. : 

Thomas McGill & Co.. Law Printers, 1107 E Street Northwest. 
1880. 



1 



s.-^M' 



in 



PREFACE. 



Report of Gcncrah Schojield caul Terry and Colonel Getty. 

From the report of the board of officers — General Scho- 
field, General Terr}', and Colonel Getty — convened to ex- 
amine and report on the evidence on which General Porter 
was cashiered, it appears, (page 3,) in their own words, 
that 

" While the Army of the Potomac was withdrawing from 
its position on the James River in August, 1862, the Army 
of Virginia under General Pope was ordered to hold the 
line of the Rappahannock, and to stand on the defensive 
until all the forces coukl be united behind that river. 

" General Pope was given to understand that when this 
concentration was effected Major-General Hal leek, the 
commander-in-chief, was to take the field in command of 
the combined armie's. On the other hand, it appears that 
General McClellan, of the Army of the Potomac, was given 
to understand that he was to direct the operations of all 
the forces in Virginia as soon as they should be united. 

" It appears further, that on the 25th of August Pope 
was SECRETLY informed that an active or offensive cam- 
paign was immediately to be commenced without any 
union of the forces, and under some other commander 
than Halleck or McClellan." 

Which commander turned out to be himself, or really 
McDowell, by whom the orders, and evidence, and opera- 
tions plainly prove that they were misdirected and bedev- 
illed for the next five days — 26th to 30th August. 

Just as at and previous to Shiloh, every order and opera- 
tion and neglect before and during the battles of the 29th 
and 30th were directly calculated for the defeat of the united 
armies of about fifty thousand men, which defeat would 
have been accomplished but for the disobedience of a corps 
commander, never pressed for his evidence, which will 



prove that by such disobedience on the Union right his 
own corps and the army were rescued from capture or 
dispersion. 

The direct evidence of this diabolical intrigue concocted 
between Halleck, McDowell, and the '^'Aulic counciV in 
Washington is not given, but, if not destroyed, doubtless 
exists, if any other evidence is wanting than the orders of 
General Pope, suggested or dictated by McDowell, from 
the 26th to the 30th August, 1862. Avoiding the use of 
all this conclusive evidence as not within the rule of their 
•commission, the board plainly state that " they have taken 
due care to avoid inquiry into the conduct of the officers 
■of the Army of Virginia, and take that view of the subject 
which in the least possible degree involves any question of 
the acts, motives, or responsibility of these (entirely respon- 
sible) officers." 

This the writer hiiving found to be literally the fact— a 
fact depriving the evidence of at least nine-tenths of its 
force as applied to General Porter's case and the truth of 
history — and the case being so nearly parallel to his own 
case, and to the atrocities of Shiloh, the underlying and 
suppressed facts of the cases directly corroborating each 
other, he has deemed it an individual right and a public 
duty to introduce this episode into the Shiloh history. 

The conduct of Halleck, Grant, and Sherman at Shiloh 
is so closely allied to that of Halleck, Pope, and McDowell 
at Manassas, that the same rule of the logicians and natur- 
alists must apply to both — that in such cases the true solution 
of any doubt is that lohich reconciles all the plaint}/ established 
facts. 

In both cases such facts by the score are only to be rec- 
onciled by an intent to defeat the Union armies; proving 
that Halleck, having failed to obtain the recognition of 
the Confederacy by the defeat of the Union armies at 
Shiloh, was transferred to Washington to accomplish the 
same purpose through the instrumentality of Pope and 



6 

to the relations of John Pope and Fitz John Porter ckiring- 
the whole afternoon of August 24, 1862, as will appear 
further on. 

General Porter was found guilty of disobedience that 
day to a joint order directed to him and McDowell, — an 
order it was impossible for Porter, the junior officer, to 
disobey, but which was in spirit disobeyed by McDowell, 
his senior in command, as far as possible. Here is the joint 
order: 

[No. 2G.] Headquarters Army of Virginia, 

Centreville, August 29, 1862. 

You will please move forward witli your joint coiiimands towards- 
Gainesville. I sent General Portei- written orders to tiiat effect an 
liour and a lialf ao;o. Heintzelman, Sigel, and Reno are moving on 
the Warrenton tnrnpilie, and must now be not far from Gainesville. 
r desire tl)at, as soon as communication is establisiiod between this 
force and yoin- own, the whole command siiall iialt. It may be neces- 
sary to fall back beliind Bull's Kiui at Ceutrevillt^ to-niglit. I pre- 
sume it will be so, on account of our supplies. I have sent no orders 
of any description to Ricketts, and none to interfere in any way witli 
the movements of McDowell's troops, except wliat I sent by his aide- 
de-camp last night, which were to hold his position on the Warrenton 
pike until the troops from here shoidd fall on the enemy's (lank and 
rear. I do not even know Ricketts' position, as I liave not been able 
to find out wjiere General McDowell was until a late hour tiiis morn- 
ing. General McDowell will talve immediate steps to communicate 
with General Ricketts, and instruct him to rejoin the otiier divisions 
of Ills corps as soon as possible. 

If any consid(M-able advantages are to be gained l)y departing from 
this order it will not be strictly carried out." One tiling must be had 
in view, that the troops must occupy a position from which tliey can 
reaeh Bull Run to-niglit or by morning. Tlie indications are that the 
whole force of tlie enemy is moving in tliis direction at a pace that 
will bi-ing tiiem liere by to-morrow night or next day. My own head- 
quarters will be for the present with Heintzelman's Corps, or at this 
place. 

John Pope, 
Major-General Connnanding. 

This order being discretionary, it was impossible to dis- 
obey except by advancing towards the enemy, in not at- 
tacking whom, with no order to attack, originated a ground- 
less charge of disobedience. That is, Porter was ordered 
to advance no further than essential to connccl with troops 
on his right, and was charged with disobedience for not 
advancing when the order was fulfilled, as follows: 

The joint order handed McDowell by or before 10 a. m.. 



SECOND HULL-RUN BATTLE GKOUND 



G. — Gainesville. 
L. L.— Longstreet. 
J. J.— Jackson. 
U— Reynolds. 

August 29, 18r,2, 




Q McDowell, li> a. m. 



Pope. [J 



specifies that so soon as, in advancing on the converging 
routes, the pike and the raih'oad connection occurs, the 
whole command should halt. How the advance was to be 
made is not specified, but, being near the enemy, it was of 
course understood that they were to advance in line or 
abreast, by flanks of regiments or companies, so as to admit 
of being instantly thrown into line of battle. When the 
order was received McDowell came into command of 
about 17,000 men, not counting Ricketts', whose men were 
purposely worn-out by hunger and perpetually useless 
marching day and night. King's division was near the Sudly 
road, 8,000 strong, and Porter's column extended two miles 
towards Gainesville, 9,000 strong. These 17,000 men, with 
artillery and cavalry, would about have tilled the four miles 
or less along the Sudly road to the pike. Eeynolds, of 
McDowell's corps, would have extended the line a mile or 
more north of the pike, to a point about opposite Jackson's 
left, and the troops of Heintzelman, Sigel, and Reno would 
have constituted a line of equal extent in their front or rear. 
The first condition was, therefore, fulfilled. 

The order contemplates anything but a battle, and posted 
as above stated, the troops would have been near their sup- 
plies and secure against attack till suificiently rested to 
meet it ; while the divisions of Ricketts at hand. Bank? 
8,000 men at Bristoe, and Couch not far ofi', with Sumner 
and Franklin waiting transportation at Alexandria, and 
Cox's just up, and some 20,000 men constituting the imme- 
diate defenses of Washington, in all about 130,000 men, 
would have left little or no chance of Lee's 50,000 jaded 
men getting back to Riclnnond, had the object been any- 
thing else than the defeat and capture of Pope's army foi 
ulterior and sinister purposes, some time to be developed 



McDowell's Operations and the 4:30 p. m. Order, 

August 29, 1862. 

But to return to McDowell, who, when he came up with 
Porter in presence of the enemy at Dawkins' run, ex- 
claimed, in accordance with the joint order, " Porter, you 
are too far out," and that that was no place toUght ahattle, 
in apprehension douhtless that if Porter attacked, even with 
J 7,000 men, at noon, there was a probability of gaining the 
])attle he (McDowell) was striving so hard to lose. To 
insure which defeat, instead of deploying King's 8,000 men 
into line towards Reynolds, near the pike, which he testiiied 
could have been done out of reach and sight of the enemy, 
had there been one there, which he on oath denied; in- 
stead of deploying King's or Porter's troops on a line King 
had marched over the night before, he invoked defeat by 
losing four hours in taking King four to six miles round 
by the Sudh- road and reaching the pike about sunset, aftei' 
which he viciously pushed his troops forward, under pre- 
tense that the enemy was in retreat, knowing such was not 
the fact, and thus accomplisliing the slaughter and capture 
of several hundred men, without other result than weaken- 
ing the army for next day's battle. 

Meantime, without a possibility of making any effective 
use of King's troops,^ such as Porter was about doing at 
noon, he left him in the condition of the rifleman behind 
his tree, with near a mile of open ground before him and 
M'ith more than double his force in the woods beyond, the 
enemy having 2,500 cavalry and ample artillery in position, 
which Porter had not in hand or could not have used, and 
had he attempted an advance the destruction or dispersion 
of his cor{)s would have been inevitable, as the board report, 
by less than half his force, according to all martial proba- 
bilities. 

Now, if McDowell did then and there order Porter to 



sittack with 9,000 men, or double that miniber, he should, 
according to the evidence of Warren, &c., have then been, as 
he should be now, dropped from the Army Register as an 
•otiicer detrimental to the service, in accordance with a law 
of July 17, 1862, under which, by the by, it was recom- 
mended, on the suggestion of the Shermans, that the col- 
onel of the 46th Ohio, after his sentence was declared a 
nullity ISTovember 19, 1862, should be dropped from the 
rolls as an ofhcer of such loeU-known mcapacUy as to l>e im- 
pedimental to the welfare of the service, the recommenda- 
tion being consequent on holding his position .on the field 
•of Shiloh several hours after his regiment and the field had 
been deserted by his three immediate commanders — doubt- 
less on Falstaff's plea as to the constituents of valor. 

And had justice been, as injustice was, the rule in 1862, 
what could have been more just than General Pope's sub- 
jection to this law, had he really been, as he was not really, 
responsible for this most treacherous 4:30 p. m. order of 
August 29, 1862. This trap set for Porter, and suggested 
■doubtless by McDowell himself And while it is in hand, 
let this order be crucibled as it would have been by General 
Schofield's board had they not, as they say, " taken due care 
to avoid all inquiry into the conduct of Pope, McDowell, and 
Halleck,''^ thus giving us more or less of a paraphrase of the 
play of Hamlet with Hamlet's part omitted. The order is 
as follows : 

[Xo. .39.] Headquarters in the Field, 

August 'l^d, 1SG2— 4.30^;. m. 
Mnjor-Genoviil Porter : 

Your line of niarcli briiig.s yoii in on tiie enemy's v\g\\t flank. 1 
(lesii-c you to pnsii forward into action at once on tiie enemy's Hank, 
juid, if possible, on liis rear, keeping- yonr riglit in communication 
witii General Reynolds. 

The enemy is massed in the woods in front of us, but can be siielled 
out as soon as you engagui tiieir tiaiik. Keep heavj' reserves and use 
join- batteries, keeping well closed to your right all tiie time. In case 
you are obliged to fall b:ick, do so to yonr right aiul rear, so as to keep 
you in close coninuuiication with tiie riglit wing. 

John Pope, 
Maior-General Commanding. 



10 

The most prominent feature of this most muddled, de- 
signing, and impracticable order, thrice repeated, is to keep 
in connection with Reynolds, some two miles on Porter's 
right. 

Should he have made an attack without implicit obedi- 
ence to the condition of first connecting with the force on 
his right, (made impossible by McDowell, if at all possi- 
ble,) he could have been held responsible for inevitably 
disastrous results. The dispersion or capture of his corps, 
followed by that of the army, as is proven, was intended b}' 
this order, which General Schotield intimates was ''part of a 
(jcneral plan,^'' which doubtless it was, lor that specific pur- 
pose. 

To have connected with Reynolds in the daj'-time over 
a route made practicable for artillery, would have required 
hours of work by thousands of men doubtless as destitute 
of tools as the army was of transportation, subsistence, and 
forage, though the machinations of the commander-in-chief 
and the ^' Aullc cowiciV^ in Washington meanwhile denounc- 
ing McClellan for such deficiency, as is now done. 

This bar to connection would have existed with no enemy 
in front and as Porter was situated. General Warren, of 
the engineers, has testified that it could not have been safely 
accomplished with less than 30,000 men, against 25,000 of 
Longstreet's corps. 

Suppose, however, the required connection made with 
Reynolds, half a mile (as he is placed) east of Groveton, on 
the pike. The left of Porter would then have been near 
the railroad, and with the right of the enemy no further 
south, and one or one and a half miles in front. To attack 
this flank, except certain that Reynolds could at the same 
time beat back Jackson, Porter must lengthen his line to 
make a flank, or even a front attack, as ordered, and break 
the connection. 

Suppose again, however, this connecting condition ful- 
flUed, there are two others still impossible. 



11 

One is, on a line of attack requiring not less than 12,000 
men, to keep heavy reserves and the connection also, with 
9,000 men. 

The other is to make use of his batteries in the advance 
over ground next to impassable by day and of course more 
so by night. 

Meantime, while making this attack, he must obey the 
Joint order, twice stated and not countermanded, to get 
back that night behind Bull Run for supplies. " For sup- 
plies'''' !! ! And here is another notable instance of the 
avoidance by the inquiry board into the conduct of the 
officers of the Army of Virginia, of which Ilallack was to 
have been the cheif, after the union with that of the Poto- 
mac, which armies, just as happened at Shiloh, were to bo 
defeated about the time of their junction — the blame at 
Shiloh having been prepared for Buell, and at Manassas 
forMcClellan. 

At Shiloh the defeat was well-nigh accomplished both 
days by keeping back reinforcements, while here the main 
engine of ruin was the withholding of transportation and 
suppUes; next, the exhaustion of the troops, and keeping 
25,000 of them off' the iield, (Banks, Kicketts, Couch, &c.,) 
the supplies being largely accumulated at Manassas for 
destruction by the Confederates, of what they could not 
use after their long invasive march. 

Shiloh and Manassas are the Castor and Pollux of bat- 
tles lost by treachery, as Cannae and Thrasymenus in the 
days of Rome were the twin battles of Hannibal, the 
swarthy prince of all able commanders, won by strategy 
and tact. 

Could there be a plainer proof of foul play than the fat;t 
that while professing to the troops and the country to be 
operating on the defensive, this army of 50,000 worried 
and worn, sleepless, and half-starved Union volunteers, 
exhausted by useless marching two or more days and 
nights, should thus be unsuspectingly pushed forward into 



12 

inevitable and most l)loody battle, without proper stores 
sufficient for a single day ? 

Verily, yea verily, more than sufficient for that day was 
the evil thereof, if its architects continue to pass with im- 
'pimiUj. 

Note 1. — As to the 4:30 p. m. order. 

One most important question never yet mooted is why, 
when writing the 4:30 order, and, ignorant at the date 
of the order where Poi'ter and McDowell were, of course 
supposing them together. Why was not this also a 
Joint order or an order to McDowell alone, as senior 
commander ? The writer has been unable to read all the 
evidence, but he finds no such query addressed to Pope on 
the court-martial, and, doubtless apprehending such ques- 
tions, he paid no attention to a summons to attend the 
board of inquiry. Everything plainly indicates that Mc- 
Dowell not only dictated this order but saw Pope just be- 
fore or when it was written. Every dictate of truth and 
right demands that Pope should be called to answer why 
McDowell's name was omitted in this 4:30 p. m. order, 
August 29, 1862, unless he knew McDowell on the march. 

Note 2.— On McDoivcirs position, 29th August, 4:26^;. ni. 

An illustrative ''Map No. 2, Battle-field of Manassas,'' 
showing positions and niorciuents of troops August 24, 1862, 
to accompang closing argument of counsel for the gorernmcnt. 
Positions laid doion bg him. Time of dag, 6 /). m. 

McDowell is located at 4 p. m., in first position , one-half 
mile east of Groveton, as seeming to have advanced by 
Compton's lane with King's division under Hatch. At 6 
p. M. this division is located one-half mile west of Grove- 
ton in action, doubtless to represent the night attack or- 
dered by McDowell on pretense of pressing a retreat by 
which hundreds were wantonly captured, crippled, and 
killed. 



13 

It is plainly a McDowell glorification map, showing that 
McDowell was in the battle-field at 4 p. m., and therefore- 
miist have seen Pope before the 4:30 order was written,, 
and was in action with the division of King under Hatch 
half an hour before sunset. Pope has improved in this 
map on one made iov the "Aidic coimcil" in which Mc- 
Dowell, with Hatch, has the enemy in his front, near a mile 
west of Groveton, on the pike, with Schenck, Reynolds, and 
Sigel a mile in rear of his advanced troops. 



APPENDIX. 



The first part of General Pope's evidence on General 
Porter's trial shows that he reached the battle-field, just 
east of Groveton, Va., about noon, and told General 
Heintzolman, &c., that they were expected barely to hold 
their ground, as McDowell and Porter would soon attack 
Jackson's right flank, some four miles ott', towards Gaines- 
ville. 

2. That he waited near Groveton for these two (2) oflS- 
cers till about 4J p. m., when, as neither appeared, he 
wrote the 4.30 order directing General Porter to attack 
Jackson's right flank, not knowing ivhere he was at the time, 
though expecting him both at Groveton and near Gaines- 
ville!!! 

The fair inference from the statement that neither Mc- 
Dowell nor Porter appeared at 4.30 p. m., was that they were 
together under the joint order of the morning, and that 
therefore the- order to attack should have been a joint 
order, and on this inference the above note, i^o. 1, was 
printed. 

Looking further at Pope's evidence, he states that Mc- 
Dowell reached Groveton at half-past 5 or G; then states. 



14 

the time about 5 ; and a map made up by him and Mc- 
Powell shows the last on the field near Groveton at 4 p. m. 

Now, firstly, from this evidence, (supposing the first part 
correct,) it may fairly be inferred that the 4.30 order should 
have been a joint order, and lastly, that it was suggested 
by McDowell as a trap for Porter; as it can now be proven, 
outside the map, that McDowell and Pope met before 4.30 
p. M., August 29, 1862, near Groveton. As above stated, 
Pope tells Heintzelman, &c., from 12 to 4J p. m., that he 
was expecting McDowell and Porter to attack Jackson's 
right, well back or west, towards Gainesville, which he 
afterwards repeats, and then writes the 4.30 order, because 
neither appeared on the field east of Groveton ! ! What 
was such evidence worth ? 

Pope's evidence further proves (if such evidence proves 
anything) that when he wrote the 8 or 9 a. m. joint order 
(which he also states was written between 5 and 6 a. m.) it 
must have been understood between McDowell and Pope 
that the former was to march, ashe did march, with King's 
division, direct from Manassas to Groveton, leaving Porter 
with less than 10,000 men to march on Gainesville and at- 
tack Longstreet's 25,000 men, as Pope well knew, before 
noon, were up; while the right wing, Heintzelman, &c., 
were, of necessity, to remain skirmishing or inactive east 
of Groveton, and not to march at all, though stated in the 
order that they were marching at 9 a, m,, the great object 
plainly being to insure the junction of the Confederate 
"forces, and then by the defeat and dispersion or capture of 
Porter's corps to eftect that of the whole arm}', and the 
recognition of the Confederacy. 

Pope's entire evidence is a tangled mass of '^^non mi ri- 
cordos,^^ contradictions, and evasions, entirely justifying the 
charge that he and McDowell were made use of by Hal- 
4eck, &c., for that purpose alone — the defeat of the Army 
of Virginia. 

Let justice first be done General Porter, and then, by all 



15 



means, let us have the court-martial rightly proposed by 
Senator Burnside, demanded, as it is, by every considera- 
tion of justice, truth, and right to the army, the govern- 
ment, and the people, 

T. W. 



CONCLUSION 



If there is any substantial evidence of the secret and 
contradictory intentions of the War Department, as set 
forth in the report of the inquiry board, there was no case 
for the government on Porter's trial; and without such 
secret intentions on the fiice of the joint order and the 4.30 
order of August 29, 1862, there was no ground for a charge 
of disobedience against any officer in the Army of Virginia, 
but ample proof of criminality against the Union com- 
manders. T. W. 



To THE Officers and Soldiers of the Civil War. 

To the volunteers of the Civil War, and especially to 
West Point graduates, I would, as a graduate of 1827, ear- 
nestly submit that if it comes to be understood among the 
people that officers educated at the Military Academy may 
with impunity become the wiUing instruments of ambitious 
politicians, the days of the Academy are, and ought to be, 
numbered; and therefore — 

I request their signatures to a memorial I shall forward, 
either for the court-martial proposed by General Burnside 
in the Senate, or as a preliminary to an inquiry by Con- 
gress, with leave to the military committees to call for per- 
sons and papers in regard to the battles of Shiloh and the 
second Bull Run, to determine upon whom the responsi- 
bility should rest of these days of disaster and dishonor to 
the military character of the Eepublic. 

T. WORTHINGTON. 



NOTICE. 

The next of two additional parts of the history of the 
second Bull Run battle will, if published, contain a dissec- 
tion of the narrative part of the ''joint ordcv,^'' plainly prov- 
ing what is stated in tlie unsigned report of McDowell's 
board of inquiry, that he was plainly responsible for the 
junction of Lee's army, when Jackson's capture, but for 
his action on the 28th of August and the night following, 
would have been in e vital)! e. 

That General Lee was acting under an understanding 
with some Union authority when he allowed Jackson to 
keep so far ahead of Longstreet, is just as plain as that 
General Johnson at Shiloh would never have exposed his- 
right flank and rear by his plan of turning the Union left 
without assurance that this flank and his rear would not be, 
as they were not, disturbed by Grant. 

I would be deeply grateful to officers of the army and 
others who receive this paper for ten cents, more or less, 
in postage-stamps, or one dollar for the complete histor}' 
of Grant at Shiloh, with the corroborative episode of the 
second Bull Eun battle, more especially as by performing 
this last duty as a soldier of the civil war, I shall I'isk all 
chance of collecting my dues from the Government. 

T. WORTIIINGTON, 
Late Colonel 46tli Oliio Vols. 
Washington, D. C, Febniarv 15, 18S0. 



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